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The Stability Pact aims at achieving a lasting peace and stability of the region and is based on
the support from the main international organisations and integrations. The objectives of the
Pact relate primarily to fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic
prosperity. Permanent peace and stability in South East Europe will be attainable when the
democratic principles and values that many countries in the region already promote take
deeper roots. The Stability Pact is not an international treaty, nor does it have the legal force
of such, rather the Pact is a political agreement resting on several elements. Among different
countries the Pact was not received with equal enthusiasm: On the one hand, delighted cham-
pions of the Pact call it a "millenarian project ", while on the other; its opponents think of it as
of a dangerous precedent causing a series of new difficulties. The major aims of the Pact are
related to the solution of human rights problems and democracy, economic growth and secu-
rity matters.
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1. Introduction
The adoption of the Sarajevo Declaration and
the acceptance of the Stability Pact in Sarajevo on
July 30 1999 set in motion a process marked by a
logo of eight stars in Sarajevo's Zetra. This was
meant to indicate that the eight states of South East
Europe had set off in a new direction, and that in the
future they should be able to get closer to those real
stars on the flag of the EU.
Heads of state and international organisations
played up the Sarajevo meeting, and thus also gave
a certain guarantee that the Pact should become a
framework for the great process of getting S. E. Eu-
rope closer to European union and the European
political and social order.
. Professor of international relations at the Faculty of Political
Science, University of Zagreb.
2. The Stability Pact in South
Eastern Europe: Objectives and
Mechanisms
The Preamble to the Pad says that the coun-
tries of South Eastern Europe recognise their respon-
sibility for working together within the international
community and developing a strategy for the stabil-
ity and growth of the region and for cooperating,
together with the major donors, so that the strategy
should be achieved. Lasting peace, prosperity and
stability for South Eastern Europe will be achieved
via a comprehensive approach to the region involv-
ing the EU, OSCE, Council of Europe, UN, ATO,
OECD, WEU, IFIs and the regional initiatives. Par-
ticular attention was given to the fact that the Pact
would be helped by the USA and that it would ob-




Among the principles and norms of the Pact 0
are listed the documents that are to be adhered to by
the conference's participants: the UN Charter, the Fi-
nal Act from Helsinki, the Charter of Paris, the Co- 0
penhagen Document of 1990 and others, with the aim
of promoting good neighbourly relationships. It was
agreed to build upon regional multilateral and bilat-
eral agreements that were an integral part of the Pact.
A particularly important clause, which in a
sense is an important new departure, relates to the
so-called human dimension. The obligations, it is
stressed, that have been taken on through member- 0
ship in OSCE, are the concern of all the states that
take part in the Pact, and do not belong exclusively
to the internal affairs of a given state. Bearing in mind
events in ex-Yugoslavia, this provision clearly sets
out the need to respect these obligations as one of 0
the foundations of international order.
Further, stress is laid on the countries of the
region taking part in the Pact:
o committing themselves to continued develop-
ment of democratic and economic reforms,
o developing bilateral and regional cooperation
that will accelerate their integration, on an in-
dividual basis, into Euro-Atlantic structures,
o having the right to choose or change their se-
urity arrangements including treaties and alli-
ances, respecting the rights of others and not
strengthening their security at the expense of
the security needs of others, while EU mem-
bers will help them on the way to integration.
The objectives of the Pact relate primarily to
fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights
and economic prosperity. The countries of the re-
gion to which the Pact relates, together with the other
participants of the Pact, stressed these objectives:
q putting an end to tensions and crises, as a con-
dition of stability, which implies implementing to-
gether multilateral and bilateral agreements as well
as internal measures to prevent conflicts,
o the construction of a mature democratic soci-
ety, based on free and fair elections, the rule
of law and respect for human rights and liber-
ties, including minority rights, and the exist-
ence of independent media and an independ-
ent judiciary capable of fighting against cor-
ruption and thus deepening and strengthening
civil society,
o the creation of good neighbourly relations
based on respect for the principles of the Hel-
sinki Final Act, confidence building and rec-
onciliation, and the encouragement of rnecha-
nisms leading to cooperation in the field of
security,
preservation of the multinational and
multiethnic diversity of the countries of the
region and protection of minorities,
the creation of a dynamic market economy,
based on sound macroeconomic policies, in-
creased foreign trade and private investment,
transparent tariff and commercial regimes, the
development of a powerful capital market and
diversified ownership, including privatisation,
leading to a wider circle of prosperity for all
citizens,
the encouragement of economic collaboration
within the region and between the region and
Europe and the rest of the world, and the crea-
tion of areas of free trade and the promotion
of unlimited contacts among citizens,
combating organised crime, corruption and
terrorism and all criminal and illegal activi-
ties,
o the prevention of forced depopulation and
migrations brought about by poverty,
o ensuring free and safe return for all refugees
and displaced persons to their homes and help
for countries in the area to bear the costs, and
o creation of the conditions for the countries of
South Eastern Europe to attain full integra-
tion into the political, economic and security
structures of their choice.
Permanent peace and stability in S. E. Europe
will be attainable when the democratic principles and
values that many countries in the region already pro-
mote take deeper root, including in the FR of Yugo-
slavia. It is hoped that this country too will become
a full member of the Pact, and until that happens,
the efforts of Montenegro, a constituent part of FR
Yugoslavia, to take part in the meetings of the Pact
are welcomed.
The mechanism of the Pact consists of a cen-
tral Regional Table for South Eastern Europe to su-
pervise the progress of the Stability Pact, carry it
forward and provide leadership for the attainment
of the ends. The Stability Pact will have a Special
Coordinator, who will be appointed after consulta-
tion with the OSCE Chairman in Office and other
participants. He is responsible for achieving the
Pact's objectives within and among the individual
countries. The special coordinator will submit peri-
odic progress reports to the OSCE.
The Regional Table will set up three Working
Tables:
o the Working Table on Democratisation and
Human Rights
o the Working Table on Economic Reconstruc-
tion, Development and Collaboration and
o the Working Table on Security Questions.
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In the Regional Table and the Working Tables
participants of the Pact will be involved. Countries
assisting the Pact, international organisations and
institutions, and regional initiatives, if they so wish,
can also take part in the work of the Regional Table
and the Working Tables. Neighbouring and some
other countries interested in joining the EU and other
international organisations can also be invited as
observer-members or observers, without thereby tak-
ing on any future obligations to collaborate.
The fifth chapter of the Pact considers the roles
of and cooperation among the participants. The Pact
should ensure effective coordination among the mem-
ber states, states that are helping the Pact, interna-
tional organisations and regional institutions. Here
stress is placed on the roles of the EU, OSCE, CE,
UN, UNHCR, NATO, the USA, the Russian Federa-
tion, IFIs, OECD and the WED. In Chapter VI re-
gional initiatives and organisations are cited:
Royaurnont, the Organisation of Black Sea Economic
Cooperation, the Central European Initiative and
SECr (South East European Cooperation Initiative).
In the Annex to the Pact, the manner in which
the Regional Table and the Working Tables act. They
are supposed to:
o discuss issues in the multilateral framework
o identify projects that make it easier to achieve
the arrangements and measures related to the
objectives of the Pact,
o and they should give momentum for further
action whenever necessary.
The Working Table about Democracy would
consider: democratisation and human rights, includ-
ing minority rights, freedom of the media, the build-
ing of civil society, the rule of law and so on.
The Working Table on Economic Develop-
ment: economic development in the region and be-
tween the region and the rest of Europe, promotion
of free trade zones, border-crossing transport, energy
supply issues, promotion of the private sector, envi-
ronmental protection, reintegration of refugees.
The Working Table on Security Matters: issues
of the judiciary, migration, measures for combating
crime, corruption and terrorism, transparency and
confidence building, the implementation of Dayton
and Paris Article IV Arms Control Agreement and
negotiations about Article V in order to step up con-
trol, security and the building of confidence, taking
into account existing obligations and commitments
under the CFE Treaty. It is supposed to be supplied
with regular information from the competent bodies
addressing cooperation on defence/military issues
aimed at enhancing stability in the region and among
countries in the region, and facilitating the sustained
engagement of all concerned to ensure regional secu-
rity, conflict prevention and management. The work
of this Table will be coordinated with the activities of
European and Euro-Atlantic structures.
The Working Tables will inform the Regional
Table about their work. The Working Tables will
have meetings either in individual states of the re-
gion or in the venue of the Permanent Council of the
OSCE in Vienna or in the member countries of the
EU or in the HQ of the EU.
The S. E. Europe Security Pact is not an inter-
national treaty, nor does it have the legal force of
such. This is a political agreement that is fairly spe-
cific in terms of several of its elements.
a) In terms of participation in the Pact, it is
quite evident that there is never any clear talk of its
members, but only of itsparticipants, which are then
clearly split. Into the first group go participants from
the Region (Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Roma-
nia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina). While a place is reserved for a demo-
cratic Serbia, Montenegro has already started coop-
erating with the Pact. In the second group are par-
ticipating states that will help in the attainment of
the objectives of the Pact: Turkey, Russia, the US,
Canada and Japan. After that come participants that
are international organisations and regional initia-
tives.
b) What is particularly significant and has its
own political weight is the provision of item 7, which
says that "commitments with respect to the human
dimension undertaken through our membership in
the OSCE are matters of direct and legitimate con-
cern to all States participating in the Stability Pact,
and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs
of the State concerned". Thus human rights and the
protection of them are raised to a special place, for
this has after all been to a very large extent neglected
in South Eastern Europe. It is, at the same time, a
message to all countries that the international com-
munity will not tolerate violations of human rights
and considers them a foundation of the international
order, and that it is on this basis that the degree of
possible approaches of an individual country to Euro-
Atlantic unification will be looked at.
c) Among the aims that are mentioned in vari-
ous other international documents, or in those that
only have to do with issues relating to the region
(Dayton) an important one is certainly the urging of
the creation of a free trade zone, which should result
in closer linkage within the region.
d) The Working Tables are also new depar-
tures, and in particular with their emphasis on the
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importance of democratisation. This is in line with
the lessons of development in ex-Yugoslavia, where
it is understood that without democratisation in the
region there are no conditions, not even in a situa-
tion in which the forces and measures of a protector-
ate exist, for the building of new relations. Democ-
ratisation and human rights have gained a highlighted
position and together with economic and security
issues form a triad on which the Europeanisation of
the area is to be expected.
e) Another novelty is the requirement for the
building of civil society and the stress on the need
for action from the most important actors and indi-
viduals.
3. Proponents and Opponents
The very appearance of the Pact was received
in different ways in the countries of South East Eu-
rope. After the Sarajevo conference, the dynamics
of pro and contra evaluations was enhanced, all in
the expectation of the beginning of the functioning
of an instrument supposed to change the position of
this region of Europe.
Delighted champions of the Pact say that this
is a millenarian project, and that the new millennium
had begun in Sarajevo.' This was mainly to do with
the framework of the Pact, the sheer numbers of coun-
tries from the region participating and the 24 assist-
ing participants, as well as the numerous international
organisations and institutions.
Opponents of the Pact, on the other hand, think
that this is a dangerous precedent, that the Pact brings
with it a whole series of new perils that will not solve
the issues in this part of the world, but can only ex-
acerbate relations, thus distancing South Eastern
Europe still further from Europe.
As was to be expected, the most vehement
criticism of the Pact and the Sarajevo meeting came
from Serbia, where the Milosevic regime, immedi-
ately after the war and the loss of Kosovo, claimed
that this was a new document meant to keep the coun-
tries of the region in subordinate positions. The
Sarajevo meeting was branded a group of enemies
of Serbia. On the other hand, some Serbian opposi-
tion leaders and representatives of their opposition
that were present in Sarajevo expressed their satis-
faction with the Pact and the belief that this was a
relatively easy way for Serbia to get out of the isola-
tion that the Milosevic regime had got it into. One
important thing was the participation of President
Djukanovic of Montenegro, who found the doors of
the Pact open for him and who is obviously hoping
that it will be of some use to him in any confronta-
tion with Milosevic, and perhaps in preserving
Montenegrin independence.'
In Hungary, just as in the case 0 f SECI, politi-
cal circles were not all that thrilled, thinking that the
greatest danger in the whole thing was that it might
take Hungary away from Europe." In the situation in
which Hungary is in the group of countries negotiat-
ing about membership in the EU, it considers that any
linkage with the Balkans is unnecessary and can only
make the road to Brussels longer. But the assurances
that came from Washington and EU headquarters made
it quite clear that participation in the Pact would not
militate against Hungary's joining the EU and that
Hungary's new membership in NATO was a guaran-
tee of the possibility of getting into the overall Euro-
Atlantic structure. Hungary is expected to be a kind
of help with and link to South Eastern Europe and to,
on the one hand, help with the work in its area and, on
the other, through its new closeness to the EU, to serve
as a signpost of development, which those countries
might one day follow as well.
Romania and Bulgaria see in the Pact an op-
portunity to stabilise their positions vis-a-vis Brus-
sels, and take their associate memberships as some-
thing that gives them a better position than that of
the group of five, or, as the Pact says, of the coun-
tries of the West Balkans that do not have this form
of linkage with the EU. Apart from that, for both
countries, this collaboration in the region might be
useful, because there is a considerable interest in the
development of transportation, the provision of en-
ergy paths and environmental protection in the Pact,
and with political and security stability, they also see
possible concrete effects.
The Pact provoked particularly virulent criti-
cism in some Croatian media. A country that has been
in a war and that has suffered enormous human and
material losses is understandably chary of being
lumped together with a country that it was in con-
flict with. There was also fierce opposition to any
possible Balkan integration, attempts to push Croatia
into the Balkans. From independence on, official
Croatian politics had attempted to show that Croatia
had once and forever left Yugoslavia and accordingly
snapped every link with the Balkans as well, and was
aiming at Europe. In the development of the idea of
the Pact about new democratic, political, economic
and security relations, an endeavour was seen to pull
Croatia firmly back into a region that it was con-
stantly trying to get out of and put behind itself.
An important argument supporting this thesis
can be found in Article 135 Paragraph 2 of the
Croatian Constitution, which says: "It is forbidden
to start off any procedure for associating the Repub-
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lie of Croatia with other states, an association that
might lead to a renewal of the Yugoslav state com-
munity, or a Balkan state connection in any form".'
Critics of the Pact insist on this "in any form", also
calling for a referendum to determine whether
Croatia should take part in the Pact or not. Criticisms
of the Pact say that it is written "in Mandarin" but
does nevertheless talk of countries of the "Western
Balkans" (placing Croatia in it), and that in the text
the term "States of South Eastern Europe" is used,
which leads to the idea that there is an ambition to
create an alliance of these states; that the Special
Coordinator has too great powers, and so on."
Some other critics pay particular attention to
questions of sovereignty, claiming that accepting the
Pact means truncating it, and that it has in it "leader-
ship and management mechanisms that de facto turn
Croatia into a kind of non-democratic protectorate".
This can be seen in the position of the Special Coor-
dinator, who is ascribed the role of "a kind of Gov-
ernor", and then in the authorities of the Regional
Table, which is identified with "a kind of super-gov-
ernment where attaining the aims of the Pact is con-
cerned." All this means that Croatian sovereignty will
be essentially reduced, with the spin-off that the
chances of getting Croatia into Euro-Atlantic asso-
ciations will be increased and accelerated.'
Croatian official policy insists that the Pact is
a free, adaptable and dynamic agreement, that it is a
broad framework for possible collaboration that can
be filled up with initiatives and that "we can leave
the Pact of our own free will if we note the slightest
indication of any threat of harmful linkage with the
Balkans".8
The Croatian Employers' Federation, paying
attention to the economic elements of the Pact, came
out in resolute support of the document, seeing it a
chance to develop collaboration with countries where
Croatian products might be sold more easily. Alleg-
ing that the western market is very picky and
crammed with goods and services, they say that the
South Eastern European market is more suitable. All
this, of course, on condition that the need to keep
technological pace with Europe is not neglected.
In the great debate being waged in Slovenia
about the Pact, contrary opinions are also encoun-
tered. According to one of them, the Pact is "the most
dangerous regional initiative for Slovenia since it
attained independence and started to get closer to
the EU".7 Along with the question of what the Pact
actually gives Slovenia, political evaluations linked
with life in the former state are also essential, as are
fears that the Pact might lead to certain forms offed-
eration or confederation. But what is particularly vital
is that Slovenia, like part of the Hungarian political
public, is afraid that getting up closer to the South
East might slow down progress towards full mem-
bership in the EU.
In his visit to Ljubljana in June 1999, Presi-
dent Clinton said that Slovenia had to be a link be-
tween Europe and the Balkans. It seems that this is
the idea of President Kucan too, who says that in the
Pact Slovenia can show its worth, and reap some
economic benefit as well. He understands that con-
temporary European processes are set at the level of
integration and that little Slovenia too had to help in
these undertakings. Seeing the wish of the interna-
tional community to take part in solving the prob-
lems of the Balkans and having experience in this
area, the Slovene government supports the Pact, be-
lieving it to provide an opportunity for new Euro-
pean legitimacy for the Slovene state.
Opposition politicians say that it could hap-
pen that by strengthening the South Eastern Europe
region, Slovenia might lose the status of a Central
European state. Apart from that, to be first in South
Eastern Europe might mean being the last in the
Central European area, and this could be induced by
a certain formalisation and institutionalisation of
relationships that the opposition cannot stand the
thought of.
Important though is one opinion that sees the
whole initiative of the Pact as just one of the forms
of Conference Tourism and empty proclamations that
are not backed up by any financial support. Political
linkage would be a mistake, and the idea that Slovenia
might be the locomotive of the Balkan train, seems,
to the chief figure behind this idea, Dr Mencinger, a
little too hasty. He recalls that not even in Yugosla-
via did Slovenia have the power to take on this role,
and that after all the events and all the existing di f-
ferences, it could not do this now.
The host country, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
has rich experience with the workings of the inter-
national community, greeted the Pact with a mixture
of praise and caution. It is said that the Pact shows
an open warning to the states of the region that there
will be no allowance of the creation of tension and
that there will be no redrawing of borders or cutting
up territory. A chance can be seen for the states of
the region to move in concert with other European
countries along the road of security, accelerated
democratic development and economic progress. The
Pact should also help in the solution of the very com-
plex question of the return of the refugees and the
displaced to their homes, which can be helped by a
regional approach and the help offriendly countries.
A country that has today only reached 40% of the
level of pre-war GDP is aware of the most important
thing: the need for financial support and investment,
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without which there can be no progress nor achieve-
ment of the aims of the Pact as set OUt.ID
4. The Pact as an instrument for
security and cooperation
The Stability Pact has still to show its first
concrete results on the basis of which it will be pos-
sible to discuss how much it has contributed to the
settling of affairs in South Eastern Europe. The ma-
jor aims of the Pact are related to the solution of
human rights problems and democracy, economic
growth and security matters. In any event, they are
major challenges that will require a great deal of work
and resources and good will in order to achieve so-
lutions that can be positive both for the region and
also for the whole system of new European relations.
For this reason, at this moment it is possible
at least to sketch in those elements in support of the
Pact, elements that might help in the creation of bet-
ter relations and the development of the region. All
these elements are, of course, inter-related and in-
terdependent, while the success of the whole under-
taking depends upon them being implemented suc-
cessfully.
o The South Eastern Europe Stability Pact is in
substance an integrated project and endeav-
ours to take in all the main problems of the
region. It is also integrated from a geographi-
cal point of view, because it does not count on
setting this region to one side in any way, but
insists on the intention of opening up the way
for the area to get into European integrative
currents, thus setting forth the main objective.
If Europe, particularly the countries of the EU,
wish to create a united European space on
which a triad of objectives (democracy, eco-
nomic development and security) is success-
fully put into practice as a project for the
present and the future, then it is impossible to
relegate South Eastern Europe to its own ten-
sions, hostilities and potential conflicts.
o The ability of the countries of the region to
work together and set up good neighbourly
relations and to achieve reconciliation within
and among themselves is also not just an aim
in itself, but is a criterion for judging their
concrete achievements in coming closer to
Europe. The region of the South East that has
lagged behind the Baltic and the Central Eu-
ropean can now speed up its transitional pace,
for its own sake and that of Europe. Although
the Pact has no binding legal force, neverthe-
o
less its political intentions and objectives are
so clear that it would be difficult to give up on
its implementation. Only if one of the coun-
tries really wanted to enter total isolation, with
all the consequences that follow from this,
could it leave the Pact and opt for some kind
of non-European life within Europe. Europe
as aim and objective is, it seems, an adequate
motive and stimulation, and, at the same time,
an inescapable factor of development, with-
out which it is impossible to imagine any
progress in life in this area.
The area of South Eastern Europe, composed
today of eight countries, and in the future per-
haps of 9 or 10 (Yugoslavia - Montenegro), is
certainly a considerable region, ifnot in terms
of economic growth, then at least from the
point of view of population size. In it there
are developed countries, medium developed
countries, and the three most impoverished Eu-
ropean countries, Albania, Macedonia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the group there is one
member of NATO (Hungary) and two prob-
able candidates for the next round of expan-
sion (Slovenia and Romania), two states that
have started negotiating to enter the EU (Hun-
gary and Slovenia), two countries that have
associate status (Romania and Bulgaria) and
the "Group of Five". This market, ifrapid eco-
nomic development got under way, could to a
great extent strengthen internal connections
and also win a better position with respect to
the EU. Apart from satisfying the traditional
demand of the EU that countries show their
ability to work together, this new development
of links could politically reveal the capacity
for linkage in the region and be the way to-
wards a joint solution for certain problems.
A country that is for the moment outside the
Pact and that in its position, size and impor-
tance certainly has an important place in the
centre of the region, Yugoslavia, can, with the
introduction of democratic conditions in its
political life, settle, via the Pact, the issues of
isolation, reconstruction and return to Europe.
Without Yugoslavia a whole series ofprojects
(transport, power, trade) will be hard to
achieve in this part of Europe, but it is also
equally clear that, without getting into Europe,
Serbia will have no way out of a crisis that is
increasingly distancing it from trends in con-
temporary civilisation and economics. The
creators of the Pact have counted on this, and
the empty seat in Sarajevo was a clear indica-
tor of the demands that the international corn-
o




munity is making on Serbia or Yugoslavia, as
well as a call to it to make some changes as
soon as possible so this country too can be a
part of the new positive trends. In any case, it
is quite clear that until the situation in Serbia
is cleared up, there can be no discussion of
stability in the area, for lurching from crisis
to crisis, Serbia will constantly spread insta-
bility in its neighbourhood.
If Europe has become aware that it is simpler
and easier to pay for the prevention of a crisis
than to find the resources to clear it up after-
wards, then the Pact too can be considered a
success. The political will of the main actors, 0
the USA and Western Europe, will be crucial
in determining the direction of development
ofthis region and not a single serious solution
can be achieved without these actors. This un-
derstandably includes readiness to work
calculatedly and over the long term. The USA
has already, in a series of steps, shown that its
entry into South Eastern Europe is a strategic
movement and that it intends to stay here."
The EU has become involved in the process
and made common cause with American
policy, which now requires wide ranging en-
gagement of a political, economic and finan-
cial and military nature. Only with a clear com-
parison of objectives that already figure in the
Pact, and with suitable instruments and means,
will the Pact have much of a chance of suc-
ceeding and speeding up the integration of S.
E. Europe into Europe. All solutions that are
only partial, indecisive and inadequately sup-
ported by appropriate instruments and financ-
ing will not be productive of success and just
turn the Pact, in spite of its considerable glam-
our, into another project that fails to achieve
results. Elements that ask us to be cautious
and can also act as permanent warning
correctives to all great plans show the con-
nection between the objective state of affairs
and individual subjective evaluations and 0
moves that are made after it. This group of
elements can be seen in the realistic balanc-
ing and comprehension of the Pact, or in the
chances that it marks up some successes.
Bearing in mind the particularities of devel-
opment in the Balkans it can be remarked once
again that the great powers have been attempt-
ing for almost 150 years to settle Balkan af-
fairs and bring some kind of peace into them.
With its diversity of nations, religions, styles
of civilisation and political viewpoints, the
Balkans is more of an anthropological than a
o
political problem. To attempt to subsume the
development of this world under some
readymade and ongoing scheme conceptions
or strategies that might perhaps produce re-
sults in some other parts of the world is to suc-
cumb to illusion. The same goes for calls for
some solutions that have their foundations in
other political climes, for it means being un-
able to take account of the Balkan specificities,
and to aim at quick-fix solutions, the kind that
have to date proved their lack of success, irre-
spective of how long certain forces have stood
behind them.
The possibility of regional cooperation, whose
main motto of action should be the formula
"through cooperation to security", cannot
achieve everything here. Anyway, the Balkan
region is one of those that has never seen the
establishment of a centre capable of pulling
in other countries, nor of any forms of col-
laboration capable of leading to the determi-
nation of the existence of a common interest.
And without visible common interest it is those
dark pages of Balkan history that have space
for their primary domination. Economic analy-
ses, on the one hand, speak of potentials for
collaboration, but on the other there are nu-
merous qualifications visible that point out
everyone of these countries has always been
more interested in relations outside the region,
that there have never been any attractive ar-
rangements among the countries, and, finally,
that there has always been a fear that too close
linkage with the Balkans would make the route
to European integration longer and more dif-
ficult. With such bad historical experience, and
so many fears from the present, it is difficult
to develop a regional form of cooperation to
be the first step to demonstrate maturity and
the capacity of these countries to solve their
problems and, within this, find some useful
forms of common action.
The wars in ex-Yugoslavia additionally height-
ened differences and hostilities, even those
segments that could have been taken as preju-
dices in the face oflarge connections, collabo-
ration and community were negated, taking the
whole of the development and the mental set
called collaboration backwards. This is today
certainly an important exacerbating factor on
which it is difficult to build new relations of a
European nature, and the feelings of countries
that have gone through the destruction of war
certainly have to be borne in mind. Beliefs that
some picture offuture material benefits might
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o
at once cancel this inheritance of evil are
nad've and have little correspondence with
reality. Similarly, the attempt to shove all these
countries together without solving certain ba-
sic questions, just equating aggressors and
victims, can be one approach for the bureau-
cratic mind, but in no way can it be a basis on
which the cooperation that is desirable and
useful to everyone can grow.
Bureaucratic approaches, which from higher
political reasons, or from the irresponsibility
of sinecure, aspire to the quick fix, coming on
as supervisors or perhaps as the only initia-
tors of action also cannot succeed here. There
are plenty of adequate examples of the mecha-
nism of bureaucratic decision-making in the
international community in recent years and
they do not need careful study or analysis to
prevent them reappearing in the Pact. How-
ever poor these countries might be and devas- 0
tated by the war, they are not prepared to wel-
come moves to weaken their sovereignty sig-
nificantly; indeed, such attempts might pro-
duce quite the opposite results. Powerful pres-
sures from outside, attempts to create and in-
stall alternative solutions closer to such cen-
tres of bureaucratic power have not so far been
well received by the people, who have voted
instead for the national option, in spite of it
being perhaps less useful. Only projects that
pay attention to the realities of relations, the
mood of the main actors and the chances for
stepwise implementation have much chance
of success and thus becoming projects for suc-
cessful development and achievement of the
objectives of the Pact. This particularly relates
to the danger of certain spur-of-the-moment
institutionalisations, which might very rapidly
not only cool certain nations down, but even
prompt them to consider backing out of the
Pact.
As distinct from the ED regional approach,
which tended towards closing groups of na-
o
tions up in their regional frameworks, the Pact
has to make it very clear in every move it
makes that its work is directed towards the
ultimate objective of entry into Europe. Every
step has to be taken in this way, whether it is
about human rights and democracy, economic
development and reconstruction, or security
approaches. For the political leaders of the re-
gion, but still more importantly for the broad
public, Europe is a phrase to which there is no
alternative and the great mass of citizens are
aware that this is the future for this region.
For this reason, only if this is consistently car-
ied out, and if every project established in the
region is based on or linked to European solu-
tions, can it count on being easily accepted.
And vice versa, attempts to set up structures
or institutions leading to regional exclusive-
ness and partiality have no chance of success.
Because of its historical inheritance, its recent
bloody past and lack of development it is im-
possible that S. E. Europe can suddenly fall
into step with Europe. For this reason, the work
of the Pact has to be designed in such a way
that it creates for all those involved, the states,
NGOs, associations and individuals, long term
conditions for linkage, the creation of joint
views and projects and accordingly the gradual
development of better mutual relationships.
Europe cannot come to S. E. Europe at once
and all of a sudden. The process of Europe-
anisation of the Balkans will be long and com-
plex, and the Stabilisation Pact can be an im-
portant instrument with the assistance of which
a constant link can be maintained with Europe.
If there is a start to the achievement of the
objectives and principles of the Pact, this will
be the most effective manner to date of build-
ing overall new relationships in the region,
through which new approaches and solutions
will accrue to the wide-ranging ideas of the
phrase "security". •
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